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LEGAL ETHICS AND MORAL DILEMMAS:
STRATEGIZING AROUND RACE
IN THE PROVISION OF CLIENT SERVICE
RICHELLE SAMUEL*
RItSUMl
Le present article explore les questions de droit et de d~ontologie que soul~ve le
racisme dans la prestation de services en clinique. L'auteur traite non seulement de la
fagon dont le racisme trouve sa place dans les cliniques, mais aussi des difficult~s
auxquelles font face les prestataires de services juridiques lorsque des clients affichent
un comportement raciste. On tente avant tout de d6finir quand une telle conduite peut
justifier une privation des services. Devrait-on tenir compte du type de comportement
raciste? En r~pondant Aces questions, 1'article examine les effets sur la prestation de
services Ades clients racistes des r~gles d'6thique professionnelle et de l'exercice du
droit selon des crit~res moraux personnels.
As a woman of colour in law school, I greeted the opportunity to leave its halls with
much enthusiasm and anticipation. My exodus from the law school would be temporary, as I was to spend one semester working at a poverty law clinic as part of my
school's academic intensive program. Up to that point, I had found my experience at
law school to be one of racist and sexist marginalization. When I arrived at the legal
clinic, I welcomed the experience as one that would be vastly different from my
experience at the law school. After my first day at the clinic I had begun to think it
was an entirely different world unto itself: fully insulated from the racial ills that had
sent me running from law school. By my second day at the clinic, however, the reality
I had begun to weave began to unravel faster then I could imagine. As a new student
in the program I had been "shadowing" a student for the day, interviewing prospective
clients when the following exchange took place:
Me:

So Mr. X, you have been denied disability benefits?

Mr. X: Yeah. I mean, what does it take before they think I'm disabled?
Me:

Yes, yes, I understand your frustration. Well, Mr. X, I'll just write my name and
extension on the back of this card so that you can get in touch with me. [At this
point I proceed to write my name, including my last name S-A-M-U-E-L].

Mr. X: [Grinning] Well, I guess I can't call you Sam. [Laughter]

*
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Me:

[Confused] Excuse me? I don't understand.

Mr. X:

You know, Sambo. That's what we used to call a friend of ours, he was black.
We'd say, "Here comes Sam," but he knew we didn't mean nothing by it. We
used to joke around like that, you know.

This essay seeks to address the legal and ethical obligations that legal-service providers have toward clients who are racist. The focus of this essay will be on the community
clinic, as this legal setting typically provides service to a racially diverse clientele. It
should be noted at the outset that this essay deliberately isolates race from other types
of oppression, namely gender, class, and sexuality. These types of oppression certainly
have implications for the provision- of legal service but will not be the focus of this
essay. To that end, this paper will explore a number of questions that arise when serving
racist clients. For instance, how can one respect the integrity of the legal-service
provider if racist clients are served? In determining which clients should receive
service, is it plausible to make distinctions between those clients whose display of
racism can be characterized as unconscious as opposed to conscious? A further
question arises about the mandate of a community legal clinic. The unique character
of a community legal clinic is such that it seeks to provide more than just legal services:
it also seeks to facilitate community development, education, and law reform. The
question then becomes whether this mandate is furthered or hindered by condoning
the racist behaviour of clients.
The methodology of this paper will entail an analysis of race and will explore in some
detail the phenomenon of racism in Canada. Towards exploring the questions raised
above, this paper will also review and analyze codes of professional conduct and
examine the principles of moral theory. Through an exploration of these theoretical
frameworks, it will be demonstrated that issues of race in the provision of legal service
cannot be resolved by employing a set of "discrete off/on yes/no choices I but rather
entail a difficult balancing of professional codes of conduct and moral theory.
FRAMING THE PROBLEM: THE NATURE OF RACISM
Racism in Canada
There can be little doubt that in the minds of most Canadians, race is a normative
concept; so normative, in fact, that to refer to it as a "concept" belies its intrinsic nature.
According to this mode of reasoning, race is as ordinary as biology. As the work of
anti-racist theorists reminds us, however, there is no intrinsic truth to race; race is very
much a social construct. 2 According to Ashley Montague, the social construction of
race is firmly rooted in the notion of group distinctions. He notes,
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When members of a society act out their emotions and beliefs in relation to the
members of other groups in discriminatory ways, based on a conception of the other
3
which is socially determined, we are clearly dealing with a group distinction.
These group distinctions are based on the idea that physical and behavioural characteristics are linked and that these characteristics are held together by this thing called
"race." These linkages of the physical and behavioural will vary between different
groups; however, within a group these links are deemed to be held in common. They
represent points of convergence and as such are considered to be indications of
common ancestry. 4 For example, kinky hair, brown skin, and a "natural ability to dance"
are all physical and behavioural traits that have been typically used to compartmentalize
those of African descent into a discreet racial category. Moreover, apart from physical
and behavioural characteristics, the cultural achievement of groups sharing common
ancestry has also been linked to notions of race. 5 This process of racialization is not
formulated in a vacuum. Instead, it is linked to social, historical, and political
processes that shift over time. By noting this phenomenon, it is in no way being
suggested that "whiteness" is not itself socially constructed. What is being suggested
is that the process through which bodies become racialized is closely linked to issues
of power, because those who hold power are able to influence our social and political
realities. In Canada context, the intersection of social, political, and historical factors
have led to the racialization of persons of colour, positing them in the category of
"other" in relation to whites, who are posited as the "norm." It is this social construction of race that'provides the foundation in which racism occurs.
Race discrimination or racism has typically been defined as racial prejudice supplemented by institutional power. Racism is used to the advantage of one racial/ethnic
group and the disadvantage of other groups. The effect of racism is to subordinate
individuals because of their colour or ethnicity. 6 It is important to note that racism
differs from prejudice, for while both constitute forms of discrimination, prejudice
does not rely upon the backup of institutional power. When subordinated groups
engage in speech or conduct that that appears to be racist, what we are in fact dealing
with is racial prejudice. As Donna Young notes, an understanding of this phenomenon
must be grounded in an understanding of the "differential of historical and social
power of racial groups."'7 In Canada, racism has been used to "regulat[e] the presence,
aspirations, actions and livelihood of non-white people."'8 To that end, racism in
Canada is premised on the subordination of persons of colour. In order to appreciate

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Ashley Montague, "Race the History of an Idea," in Ruth Miller & Paul Dolan, eds., Race Awareness: The Nightmare & the Vision (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) 175.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Resources from the Council on Interracial Books for Children (New York: The Center, 1994).
Anti-Racism Advisory Committee of the OHRC, The Donna Young Report: The Handling of Race
DiscriminationComplaintsat the OntarioHuman Rights Commission (Toronto: OHRC, 1992) 20.
Dionne Brand & Krishanta Sri Bhaggiyadatta, Rivers Have Sources, Trees Have Roots (Toronto:
Cross Cultural Communications Centre, 1986) 3.

(2001) 16 Journalof Law andSocial Policy

how and why the issue of race is a significant aspect of the day-to-day operations of
a community legal clinic, it is important to explore the nature and depth of racism as
it exists. An exploration of race relations in Canada reveals that racism is, and
continues to be, a deeply entrenched ideological construct that shapes the major and
minor institutions in Canadian society.
Despite professions of "multiculturalism" and "tolerance," Canada's legacy of race
relations reveals a history marred by systemic exclusionary practices linked to race.
Canadian immigration policy, for example, has traditionally been premised on keeping
undesirable "races" out of Canada. According to Lisa Marie Jakubowski, Canada's
immigration laws have seen patterns of emergence and disappearance of the term race.
By this it is meant that, at various periods in Canadian immigration policy, race was
a criterion that was either blatantly revealed in immigration policy or manifested in
more subtle ways. 9 Certainly in the early days of Canadian immigration policy, "race"
was a prominent criterion for determining who could get into Canada. During this
period, determination of who could enter was largely based on "race." Canada's
immigration policy made no effort to conceal its preference for white immigrants,
clearly satisfying its objective of maintaining a "white Canada." This "white Canada"
policy was the basis for restricting the integration of blacks, Chinese, Japanese, and
other racial groups into Canadian society.10
It has been suggested that these types of exclusionary race-based practices are still
very much in existence in Canada's immigration policies. Evidence can be seen in
such policies as the "head tax" levied against Chinese immigrants, as well as the
routine rejection of refugee applications of refugees from African and other "Third
World" countries.1 1 Moreover, social policies like the colonization and subsequent
cultural genocide of Canada's Aboriginal community, the enslavement of African
peoples, the expulsion of Japanese Canadians, and the disenfranchisement of Chinese,
South Asian, and Jewish Canadians are all features of Canadian history that, while
rarely discussed, continue to play a prominent role in current race relations.
While one is obliged to acknowledge that a history riddled with racism will, if
unchecked, have implications for current race relations, the notion of Canada as a
racist society is, for the most part, beyond most Canadians. According to the African
Canadian Legal Clinic's (ACLC) report to the Canadian Bar Association, "many
Canadians . . .maintain that there is no racism in Canada."' 12 Members of racially
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marginalized groups who are confronted by racist remarks are frequently cautioned
not to take these remarks seriously and to "relax," because they are "nothing more
than jokes" (remember Mr. X's comments to me). This is how the notion of Canada
as a non-racist society is perpetuated. Likewise, this idea is evident in the Report of
the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario CriminalJustice System 13 While
the focus of the report is on racism in the criminal justice system, the remarks of judges
and lawyers surveyed in the report indicate a larger ideology that is indifferent racism
in Canada context. Consider the following comments:
"The idea that there is widespread racism in the administration of justice is patently
false. These ideas result from an ill informed, politically correct minority who, I
believe, have no experience in the criminal justice system."
"From what I have observed, I do not see that racism is as great a problem in the
justice system as [do] the media and some individuals and self-serving interest
groups." 14
An examination of Canadian jurisprudence also reveals a type of apathy toward the
notion that racism exists in Canada. In her report on the handling of racial discrimination complaints by the Ontario Human Rights Commission, Donna Young notes that
the Commission is reluctant to acknowledge the racist underpinnings of cases. In
Nimako v. CanadianNational Hotels, the complainant's charge of racism was effectively undermined through the Commission's inability to give effect to the realities of
racism in the Canadian context:
The words [fucking black bastard] were provoked not by Mr. Nimako's colour, but
by his conduct. They expressed anger towards a man who just happened to be black,
referring to his colour, in order, perhaps, to underscore the speaker's outrage. The
implication was not that he was a "bastard" because he was black, but that he was a
"bastard" who happened to be black. It would run counter to common sense, surely,
to suggest that anyone who utters such an expression in such circumstances is
therefore racially prejudiced, that he does not like blacks, and would treat them
unfairly in comparison with others if given the chance. 15
Denial that racism exists, as evidenced in Nimako, speaks to the larger issue of the
normalcy of racism. One reasons that racism is pervasive in Canadian society is that
it is often in discernable to the individual displaying the racist conduct or to the
receiver of that conduct. This makes it easy to deny its very existence. In the anecdote
above, Mr. X's comments, insidious and inappropriate as they were, can be characterized as unconscious racism.
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Unconscious/conscious racism
According to Charles Lawrence, failure to acknowledge that racism is endemic makes
it impossible to recognize that unconscious forces motivate much of the behaviour
that prompts racial discrimination. Lawrence, speaking from the American experience,
notes that this is not surprising when one considers that Americans share a cultural
history rooted in racism. He notes,
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has
played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also
inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an
individual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about non-whites. 16
The same argument can be made of Canadians, whose cultural history as noted above
is also rooted in racism. While it is certainly not the intention of this paper to excuse
racism, the argument that we are collectively conditioned on some level to harbour
racial assumptions without knowing is valid.
A good way to comprehend unconscious racism is to examine its manifestations in
our daily experiences. Two such manifestations of unconscious racism are the "slip of
the tongue" and the "slip of the mind." When one inadvertently says something one
did not intend to verbalize, this is known as a "slip of the tongue." Often these slips
reveal the extent to which individuals have tacitly absorbed the racial assumptions and
stereotypes of our society.17 For example, during oral arguments in R.D.S. v. R., with
a "slip of the tongue" Lamer C.J. referred to Chinese-Canadians as having a penchant
for gambling. 18 While Lamer later asserted that he had no intention to offend, his
remarks show that he bought into stereotypes of Chinese-Canadians on two levels.
First, hiss comment captures the increasingly prevalent stereotype of the wealthy
Chinese, and the corresponding notion that Chinese capital is "taking over Canada." 19
Second, the remark embodies a backlash against Chinese capital in that the reference
to gambling may be seen as negating the economic advancement of Chinese-Canadians. Psychoanalytic theory would suggest that Lamer's comments were the result of
repressed stereotypes that had "momentarily slipped past [his realm of consciousness]. '20 This reasoning becomes plausible when one considers that Lamer would
certainly not intentionally reveal such a blatantly racist remark when one central theme
of the case dealt with racial bias.
The "slip of the mind," can also demonstrate unconscious racism. The defining feature
of the "slip of the mind" is that "one says what one intends, [however] one fails to
grasp the racist implications of one's benignly motivated words or behavior."'2 1 To put
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this theory into context, it is helpful to refer back to my encounter with Mr. X. No
doubt Mr. X intended to call me Sambo. What is equally clear, however, is that Mr. X
had no idea that he had offended, as evidenced by his additional comments about his
"black friend." While these unconscious forms of racism are problematic and highly
contentious, deliberate and conscious displays of racism pose an entirely new set of
challenges.
According to psychoanalytic theory, expressions of conscious racism occur when the
rational mind finds the desires of the unconscious mind reasonable. The rational mind
refuses to censor the impulses of the unconscious mind because it posits these impulses
as correct, despite societal morals to the contrary. 22 There is a sense of deliberateness
with conscious racism, because clearly the perpetrator is aware that his or her speech
is racially offensive. Having said that, however, I do not suggest that unconscious
racism is not, as a consequence, reprehensible. Nor should these comments minimize
the impact of institutional forms of racism (which are often unconscious or systemic).
What is being suggested, however, is that the individual who speaks of the "lazy
nigger" or the "miserly Jew" is likely speaking from a conscious belief; a belief that
was likely initiated in the unconscious mind, but has found rational expression in the
conscious.
In determining what strategy a legal clinic should take on the issue of race, it is
necessary to develop a practical theory that distinguishes between unconscious and
conscious racism. Clearly by doing so we are faced with the problem of saying that
one form of racism is worse than another, when in fact all forms of racism are insidious.
For the victims of racist speech, all forms of racism-unconscious or conscious-are
hurtful. The ways in which racism affects its victims take many forms, including
internalizing racist beliefs (self-hatred), isolation, low self-esteem, and humiliation. 23
In my encounter with Mr. X, knowing that his comments arose out of sheer ignorance
did nothing to lessen by anger and embarrassment. Yet in order to devise strategies
that can be effectively implemented, we must define the scope of racist speech we are
prepared to deal with. Some may argue that what is needed is a broad policy that would
restrict all forms of racist speech. Given my realities as a black woman in Canada and
the acts of subordination I frequently encounter, I must confess that this proposition
is tantalizing. However, if, as Lawrence notes, we are all affected by unconscious racist
assumptions on some level, a policy that refuses to serve any racist clients would mean
that community legal clinics would.sere no one. Moreover, it would also mean that
providers of legal services would themselves be unfit to render services because of
their own unconscious racism. The challenge, therefore, is to find some equilibrium
between these competing ideals. A comparative analysis of unconscious and conscious
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forms of racism will aid in this task, because it will determine how narrow or broad a
definition of racist speech a legal-service provider will tolerate when delivering client
service.
Intent theory is the starting point for distinguishing between unconscious and conscious racism. This is not a theory that is difficult to comprehend. Certainly in our
daily lives we make moral judgments of what is right and wrong based on the intent
of the actor. For example, a child who accidentally breaks a vase is not blamed for her
mishap, but is cautioned to be more careful in the future. Conversely, the child who
deliberately intends to break the vase is treated with more seriousness and is consequently punished accordingly because of a moral understanding that says to intentionally break the vase is wrong. Likewise, principles of criminal law also adhere to
notions of intent in determining whether the elements of a crime have been established.
In assessing the content of racist speech, one should determine the intent of the actor
in making the racist remark. Does the actor intend to cause harm with her or his speech,
or does that speech stem from sheer ignorance about the harm it may cause?
In her analysis of why assaultive speech should not be protected by the First Amendment, Mari Matsuda outlines three indicators of racist hate speech, which she distinguishes from other forms of racist speech:
1. The message is of racial inferiority
2. The message is directed against a historically oppressed group.
24
3. The message is persecutory, hateful, and degrading.

According to Matsuda, racist speech that meets all three criteria should not be
protected by the First Amendment because such speech is deliberate, hateful, and akin
to violence.
Matsuda's classification of this type of racist speech as a form of violence is particularly useful when coming to terms with unconscious and conscious forms of racism.
Matsuda's model makes it clear that many unconscious forms of racism are akin to
violence. Returning to my encounter with Mr. X, it is clear that his remarks displayed
a tacit belief in my racial inferiority, thus meeting the first criterion. As the message
was directed toward me, a black woman from a historically oppressed group, the
second criterion is also met. One runs into difficulty with the third criterion, however,
because, while Mr. X's comments were hurtful, they could not be said to be charged
with the kind of racial animus that is persecutory or hateful. In effect, there was no
deliberate, calculated effort to inflict violence. Clients who use such racist speech
should fall within the category of persons served by the legal clinic. With conscious
displays of racism, however, the actor intends his message to the racial inferiority of
the targeted individual or group; the actor intends to direct his/her message to a

24.
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historically disadvantaged group; the actor intends for her speech to be hateful and
persecutory and intends to wound with that speech.
The classification of conscious racism as a form of intentional violence makes it easier
to define what forms of racist speech a clinic is prepared to contend with, and what
forms it will not tolerate. An analysis of the intent behind racist speech therefore
suggests that individuals intend to inflict violence when (1) they promote notions of
racial inferiority, (2) they direct their speech at against historically disadvantaged
groups, and (3) the content of their speech can be classified as persecutory and
hateful. 25 Such individuals should not receive service. It should be noted that while a
test of intent might be a good way of determining whether a client should be served,
it might not be necessary when dealing with the racist speech of legal-service providers
and staff who work in the clinic. This is so because the racist speech of these employees
is already regulated by the Ontario Human Rights Code. Furthermore, most legal
clinics have policies for their employees to prevent workplace discrimination and
harassment. A client or an employee who is victimized by the racist speech of another
service provider can use their clinic's complaint procedure, and if not satisfied can
seek a remedy with the Human Rights Commission. 26 By acknowledging the already
regulated nature of employee speech within the workplace, it should not be taken to
mean that there is no need for legal clinics to adopt clear anti-racism policies. The
principles of morality lawyering suggest that legal clinics have a moral duty to
condemn conduct that is generally perceived by society (at least in theory) as reprehensible.
This paper deliberately isolates issues of class for analysis. While this is true, it is
helpful and necessary to address one possible critique to that proposal. This critique
challenges the very basis of my proposal, because it suggests that generic talk of racism
in a community legal clinic is misguided. If one operates under the premise that racism
in Canada entails the subordination of non-whites by whites, and if racism entails
racial prejudice coupled with institutional power, how can we suggest that clients in
the clinic, who are often economically repressed and who themselves lack institutional
power, are racist? The critique is valid on one hand and misguided on the other. It is
valid because it recognizes what I have previously referred to as multiple types of
oppression. It recognizes that essentialist notions of oppression fail to encapsulate the
myriad ways in which other factors subordinate individuals. The critique is misguided,
however, because it distorts the nature of racism. While poor white clients may be
economically disempowered and may not have the power to effect structural change,
they do, however, benefit from institutional power structures. As Derrick Bell notes,
speaking of black and white relations in the American context,
Even those whites who lack wealth and power are sustained in their sense of racial
superiority by policy decisions that sacrifice black rights. The subordination of
blacks seems to reassure whites of an unspoken, but no less certain, property right
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in their "whiteness". This right is recognized by courts and society as all property rights
27
are upheld under a government created and sustained primarily for that purpose.
While class is important in understanding issues of racism, it in no way precludes an
individual from being racist. One must be mindful of the fact that some forms of
oppression are transitional, meaning that they change over time, while others are
permanent. 28 Simply put, poverty can be eliminated, but one cannot change the colour
of one's skin.
Any policy that purports to resolve issues of race in a community legal clinic must
also be grounded in an analysis of the principles of legal ethics and morality theory.
An exploration of legal ethics and moral theory will help define a clinic's mandate.
This will allow for a determination to be made on whether a policy to deny service to
certain types of racist clients is in line with the clinic's legal obligations as dictated
by the profession, as well as its moral obligations to the community it serves.
Legal ethics and moral theory
The traditional model of professional conduct posits lawyers as having two key
obligations. The first is that lawyers must diligently advocate for the interests of their
clients. This is essentially the traditional agency model of lawyering, which characterizes the lawyer-client relationship as a power dynamic in which lawyers exert
influence over their clients. 2 9 The underlying reasoning of this model is that since
clients are ignorant about the law, they depend on their lawyers to look after their best
interests. The Canadian Bar Association, as well as all the provincial law societies,
recognizes this principle. 3 0 In Ontario, for instance, Rule 10 of the Law Society of
Upper Canada's (LSUC) ProfessionalConduct Handbook notes that the "lawyer...
' 31
must represent the client resolutely and honourably within the limits of the law.
The second obligation recognizes that lawyers have obligations to the profession as
"officers of the court." In this model a lawyer has a duty to uphold the administration
of justice. 32 While these codes of professional conduct are intended to direct the
conduct of lawyers in the profession, when it comes to issues of race, these codes offer
the lawyer little or no guidance. 33 The fundamental reason for this lack of guidance
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on issues of race is that the codes of professional conduct are premised on a belief that
race does not matter.
Canadian codes of professional conduct are rooted in the principle of legal liberalism
that emphasizes "the rule of law, formalism, neutrality, abstraction and individual
rights. '34 As far as issues of race are concerned, legal liberalism operates from the
belief that the rule of law is and should be applied equally to all, without distinctions
based on race or other status. So arguments that raise the issue of "difference"
jeopardize this principle and are therefore not considered legitimate. Critical Race
theorists correctly challenge this principle, 35 because legal liberalism diminishes the
salience of race in the larger societal context, as well as in the legal profession. Critical
Race theorists argue that legal liberalism provides a colour-blind, ahistoric, and
decontexualized model of lawyering that is incapable of acknowledging the subordination of people of colour. 36 If this is so, one might ask what good the codes of
professional conduct are in helping legal clinics deal with issues of race. While the
codes of professional conduct are indeed problematic, if combined with the race
analysis given above, they can provide some guidance for the clinician in dealing with
racist- clients. It is necessary, therefore, to examine what the rules of professional
conduct say about the lawyer's duty to serve clients.
A review of the LSUC's Professional Conduct Handbook reveals that there is no
express obligation for lawyers to represent each client that comes before them. In other
words, there is room within existing professional codes of conduct to withhold service.
Granted that the basis for withholding service should not be grounded in discriminatory practices as noted in Rule 28, the option to withhold service is available to the
lawyer. As Rule 12 Commentary 5 ("Right to Decline Employment") notes,
The lawyer has a general right to decline a particular employment (except when
assigned as counsel by a court), but it is a right to be exercised prudently . . .
Generally speaking a lawyer should not exercise the right merely because a person
37
seeking legal services or that person's cause is unpopular or notorious.
Reading Commentary 5 in isolation from other rules suggests that a clinic is obliged
to serve not only the unconscious racist, but the conscious racist as well. An analysis
of Rule 5 ("Conflict of Interest"), however, reveals that this is not the case. Rule 5
notes,
The lawyer must not advise or represent both sides of a dispute and ... should not
act or continue to act in a matter when there is or there is likely to be a conflicting
interest. 38
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Commentary 2 notes,
The reason for the Rule is self-evident; the client or the client's affairs may be
seriously prejudiced unless the lawyer's judgement and freedom of action on the
client's behalf are as free as possible from compromising influences. 39
Finally, Commentary 3 notes,
Conflicting interests include but are not limited to the financial interest of the
lawyer or associate of the lawyer, and the duties and loyalties of the lawyer to any
other client... 40
One must therefore ask whether there would be a conflict of interest if a community
legal clinic served clients who might be regarded as conscious racists. This paper
suggests that there is indeed a conflict of interest. One mandate of a community legal
clinic is community development. To that end, many clinics have adopted a variety of
polices to further this commitment to community development. 4 1 The service of
clients who deliberately inflict violence through their speech would amount to a
conflict of interest for a community legal clinic. Advocacy organizations that serve
conscious racists would destroy the confidence and legitimacy community that legal
clinics have with the larger community. Because of this conflict, a community legal
clinic would be justified in withholding service from such clients.
The principles of moral theory also reveal that legal clinics are justified in refusing
service to clients who are conscious racists. Moral theory recognizes that individuals
have identities that are distinct and insular from their profession. So the personal moral
commitments of individuals are just as significant and worthy of reflection as professional commitments. 42 The principle of moral theory as it relates to the legal profession
therefore suggests that lawyers possess non-professional identities and that these
identities are often shaped by distinct commitments and obligations. There is, however, a benefit to this. As moral theorists note, "personal morality models of lawyering
seek to protect values important to our legal order as professional norms must always
be justified in terms of some wider set of moral criteria" 4 3 It is also necessary to add
that personal morality codes of lawyering also allow for the protection of those values
important to our society. The moral obligations and commitments of lawyers often
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conduct that "breaks down" the community. For example, Policy 6.15 ('Policy for Withholding
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influence the manner in which they interpret their professional responsibilities. As a
result, moral theorists deem personal moral values to be essential to the lawyer's
role.44 While much of a lawyer's job entails adhering to legal rules and principles, it
also entails the exercise good judgment. The ability to exercise good judgment is,
45
according to moral theorists, linked to one's moral personality.
One might ask how notions of personal morality lawyering are relevant to the clinical
setting, because legal clinics are essentially organizations comprising many personal
identities. This is indeed true and should be underscored; however, the argument can
be made that legal clinics have their own distinct identity as well. Those employed by
legal clinics are judged to have a certain common interest that governs their actions.
This is, of course, not always true in practice, but certainly it has merit at the theoretical
level. How, then, does this relate to the issue of serving racist clients, one might ask?
To illustrate this notion, an examination of the policy directives of Parkdale Community Legal Services is instructive. A review of that clinic's anti-racism policy reveals
that it has embraced the principles of personal morality lawyering. Through its
anti-racism policy, the clinic has explicitly recognized that racism is a moral wrong
that contradicts its moral personality-a personality closely linked to the best interest
of the community it serves:
Parkdale Community Legal Services is committed to seeking justice for those who
are affected by racism. We recognize that racism plays a significant role in the
problems our clients experience. Identifying racism, and developing policies and
actions aimed at preventing it, must be integral to the services we provide, or we
fail the community.46
Withholding service to clients who may be classified as conscious racists is justified
by the principles of personal morality lawyering, which recognizes that the personal
moral obligations of lawyers are instrumental in shaping their legal obligations. This
is not to suggest that we do away with professional codes of conduct, nor does it
suggest that principles of personal morality lawyering will always trump legal ethics.
What is being suggested, however, is that a clinic's decision to serve or not to serve
racist clients must not be limited solely to analysis of legal norms, but must also engage
the lawyer in an exploration of his or her own personal morals.
CONCLUSION
This paper set out to explore the legal ethics and moral dilemmas that arise in the
provision of legal service to clients who are racist. The racist speech of clients is not
an isolated, random phenomenon, but rather is linked to the larger social and historical
realities of Canada's history-a history marred by racism. In effect, conscious and
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unconscious forms of racism are the by-products of Canadian history. A determination
of which clients will and will not be served therefore turns on understanding these
conscious and unconscious forms of racism. An exploration of the intent behind speech
suggests that conscious forms of racism entail deliberate attempts to wound. Service
should therefore be withheld to clients who exhibit this behaviour. It has been shown
that the denial of service to conscious racists need not contravene the principles of
professional conduct. In some instances, in fact, the rules of professional conduct
justify the denial of service to conscious racists. Moreover, the denial of service to
such clients can also be justified on the basis of moral theory. The challenge for the
legal-service provider, therefore, is to recognize that the decision to serve or not to
serve racist clients cannot be made in isolation from larger social and historical
phenomena. The complexity of issues of race, legal ethics, and moral theory suggests
that a decision to provide or withhold service to racist clients will always be challenging and will always engage the provider of legal services in a difficult balance.

